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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "BEST INTERESTS"
PARENTAGE
David D. Meyer*
INTRODUCTION
The premise of this Symposium is unabashedly radical: to imagine a new law
of parentage focused exclusively on the needs and interests of children. Participants
were invited to set aside questions of political feasibility and the constraints of settled
law in asking how the law should assign parentage if its only goal were to maximize
the welfare of children.
The notion is radical because, traditionally, parentage law has been driven signifi-
cantly by the needs and interests of adults - a sense of the natural entitlement of
genetic parents, for instance, or society's desire to protect marriage or enable the or-
derly transfer of wealth between generations. One need only recall parentage law's
historical treatment of non-marital children - classifying them asfilius nullius, or
the child of no one - to appreciate the point.' Even more strikingly, perhaps, the
invitation expressly assumes a governmental control over the question of parentage
that would strike many as alien. In its foundational case recognizing constitutional
protection for family privacy, after all, the Supreme Court described the idea that
government might reassign parentage in order to advance its own vision of child
welfare as resting on "ideas touching the relation between individual and State...
wholly different from" our own.2
And, yet, the invitation to think creatively and expansively about the meaning of
legal parentage is extremely timely. Judges and legislators around the country are
wrestling with the question as never before.3 The easy certainty of DNA testing and
* Professor of Law and Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois.
I am grateful to the other participants in this Symposium and to Amy Gajda and Harry Krause
for their insightful comments and reactions to an earlier draft of this paper, to the editors of the
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal for hosting an engaging and lively conference, and to
Jim Dwyer for inviting me to take part.
See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITMACY: LAw AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1971). As Professor
Janet Dolgin has pointed out, "Before the Industrial Revolution the welfare and interests of
children were not relevant to determination of custody and parentage. When called upon to
determine a child's custody or parentage, English common law virtually ignored the child's
welfare." JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION
IN AN UNEASY AGE 217 (1997).
2 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
See June Carbone, The Legal Definition ofParenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family
Identity, 65 LA. L. REv. 1295 (2005); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition:
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the fluidity of modem childrearing arrangements have combined to test fundamental
assumptions about the meaning of kinship between adults and children.' And, in
responding to the challenge, some courts have opened the door to the idea of assign-
ing parentage based directly on a judicial determination of a child's best interests.'
Accordingly, the work of crafting an explicitly "child-centered" parentage law is not
solely a matter of academic interest; it is already the real-world occupation of at
least some judges and lawyers.
The question that I take up in this article is whether the toe-hold that "best
interests" parentage has established in American law can be sustained against objec-
tions that it violates the fundamental constitutional rights of traditional parents. In
other words, is it constitutional to premise legal parentage on a governmental find-
ing of a child's "best interests"? The answer that I come to is that, perhaps not sur-
prisingly, it depends. Part I of the Article sketches the context in which the question
now arises: the breakdown of traditional parentage law - in which legal parentage
was tied closely to clear markers relating to blood, marriage, and adoption - and
the emergence of judicial interest in mediating conflicts among competing parental
figures by resort to a child's best interests. Part II considers whether substantive due
process protection for family privacy limits the state's power to pick and choose
among the competing claimants. It concludes that, notwithstanding recent suggestions
of an essentially plenary state power to redefine parental status, the Constitution likely
does confer a privacy right to parental identity on at least some individuals.
Finally, in Part II, I consider whether the privacy right to parental identity might
be overcome based solely on a governmental assessment of a child's best interests.
In my view, the answer is to be derived not from a rigid application of strict consti-
tutional scrutiny, but from a more nuanced evaluation of the competing public and
private interests at stake. Such an evaluation, I conclude, suggests that states enjoy
considerable latitude to reorient parentage law in a child-centered direction. At the
same time, any law that would defy widely shared social expectations in withholding
parentage must be justified by something more compelling than a bare "best interests"
showing. This counsels care - but not necessarily timidity - in rethinking the tradi-
tional boundaries of parentage.
Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. 125 (2006).
' See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principlesfor Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 323 (2004); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?: Redefining the Parent-
Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011
(2003).
' See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
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I. THE BREAKDOWN OF SETrLED LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF
"BEST INTERESTS" PARENTAGE
Until quite recently, parentage appeared to be "a settled category" in the law. 6
For decades now, much of family law has seemed unstable and disputed - the impor-
tance and meaning of marriage, the rights and obligations of unmarried cohabitants,
gender roles within the family, and the availability and consequences of divorce.7
But there was relatively little disagreement about the identity of the persons who were
entitled to call themselves parents.8
For most of its history, American law proceeded on the assumption that parents
were persons who created a child through sexual reproduction or who assumed the
legal obligations of parenthood through formal adoption. Identifying adoptive parents
was mostly a straightforward matter because the kinship tie typically depended on
the satisfaction of a formal legal process. 9 Identifying birth mothers was also rela-
tively easy, given the circumstances of childbirth and the usual presence of witnesses.'l
Identifying birth fathers was a trickier matter, of course, especially before the advent
of modem blood-typing and DNA analysis," but the law made do through the use
of widely accepted presumptions. Under these rules, a husband was strongly pre-
sumed to be the father of a child bom to his wife. The presumption could be over-
come only by evidence precluding any procreative role by the husband, such as by
showing that the husband and wife were separated at all times of possible concep-
tion under circumstances that guaranteed the husband's "nonaccess" to his wife.'2
In the absence of scientific proof to the contrary, however, the law considered the
husband's paternity conclusively established if they cohabited when the child was
likely conceived. 3
6 Carbone, supra note 3, at 1295.
See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989).
8 See Carbone, supra note 3, at 1295; Ira Mark Ellman, Thinking About State Custody
and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36 FAM. L.Q. 49, 51-52 (2002).
9 Although informal adoption was practiced to some extent, most adoptions were docu-
mented by courts, legislatures, or agencies. For discussion of historical practice, see Naomi
Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077 (2003); Jamil S. Zainaldin,
The Emergence of a Modem American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts,
1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1038 (1979); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Note, Private Ordering,
Legal Ordering, and the Getting of Children: A Counterhistory of Adoption Law, 20 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 263 (2002).
"0 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16
(1983); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REv. 835, 912 (2000).
' See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 115-16 (2001).
12 In re Marriage of Schneckloth, 320 N.W.2d 535, 536-37 (Iowa 1982); see also L.F.R.
v. R.A.R., 378 N.E.2d 855, 856 (Ind. 1978); see generally MICHAELGROSSBERG, GOVERNING
THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 200-01 (1985).
'3 Compare L.F.R., 378 N.E.2d at 857 (refusing to permit a husband to rebut a pre-
sumption of paternity based solely on testimony that he and his wife did not engage in sexual
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By allowing rebuttal with proof that the husband could not have been the bio-
logical father, the marital presumption was implicitly premised in part on a policy
linking parenthood with biological reproduction and on an assumption about the
probability of the husband's genetic contribution. 14 In practice, the presumption
often protected social parentage over biological parentage. 5 By barring challenges
to the presumption by persons outside the marriage, traditional parentage law was
willing to forgo an accurate attribution of biological parentage in favor of a higher
social interest in preserving the sanctity of the "unitary family" against a destabi-
lizing outside attack.' 6 Yet, given the unavailability until relatively recent times of
scientific proof of biological paternity, the law could act on the assumption that a
child's marital father was also her biological father.'
7
In recent decades, of course, the circumstances that enabled the law's tidy assump-
tions linking parenthood with biology and adoption have collapsed. Scientific proof
now makes it possible to know with virtual certainty whether a man is genetically
related to a child. Advertisements hawk "home DNA tests" enabling men (or women)
to resolve their suspicions on the payment of a few hundred dollars." At the same
time, greater fluidity and diversity in family life, as well as the advent of new repro-
ductive technologies, have greatly increased the incidence of childrearing by adults
who are not related to a child by blood or adoption. As a result, courts now regu-
larly confront claims by ex-husbands seeking to disavow paternity based on newly
acquired DNA evidence, notwithstanding their having long performed the social role
of father to a child, as well as claims by others seeking to establish parenthood based
on past performance of a social parenting role, notwithstanding the conceded absence
of any blood or adoptive tie.
Courts and legislatures have responded inconsistently to these developments, in-
troducing a fundamental incoherence to the law of parentage. On one hand, some
jurisdictions have placed significant new emphasis on biology by allowing husbands
and other established fathers to disclaim paternity, even after years of acting as a
father, based solely on DNA evidence.' 9 Along the same lines, a growing number
relations during the likely period of conception), with Minton v. Weaver, 697 N.E.2d 1259,
1259-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (finding the marital presumption overcome when a DNA test
established a 99.97% likelihood of genetic paternity in another man).
'4 See Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for
California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 McGEORGE L. REv. 637,
645-46 (2003).
'" See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity
Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 12-14 (2004).
16 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989).
" Carbone & Cahn, supra note 4, at 1019; Ellman, supra note 8, at 52.
iS See, e.g., Paternity Testing Home DNA Test Kits, http://www.homedna-test.com (last
visited Jan. 28, 2006).
"9 See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 843 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 2003); Gebler v. Gatti, No. 349
WDA 2005,2006 WL 241506 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2006); Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); see also Bartholet, supra note 4; Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child:
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of legislatures and courts have modified the marital presumption to allow men out-
side the marriage to establish their paternity based on DNA evidence, regardless of
the wishes of the marital couple.2° Some of these decisions rigidly favor a biological
conception of parenthood, even when doing so risks destruction of substantial social
parenting bonds.'
In other cases, however, courts have placed new emphasis on the significance of
"social parenting" by extending custodial rights - and in a few cases even parent-
hood itself - to non-traditional caregivers who have assumed the functional role of
a parent." A number of states now permit a longtime caregiver who has played a
major role in a child's upbringing with the consent of a parent to seek custody or
visitation of the child as a "de facto" or "psychological" parent.23 More signifi-
cantly, some states have come to allow persons to acquire legal parentage - even
Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547
(2000); Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument
Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193 (2004). In 1991, for
example, Illinois amended its parentage law to permit a man to obtain a judicial declaration
of "the non-existence of the parent and child relationship" upon offer of a preclusive DNA
test. Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 45/7(b-5) (West 2005). The
statute further directs: "If, as a result of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests, the plaintiff
is determined not to be the father of the child, the adjudication of paternity and any orders
regarding custody, visitation, and future payments of support may be vacated." Id. See also
Steven N. Peskind, Who's Your Daddy?: An Analysis of Illinois' Law of Parentage and the
Meaning of Parenthood, 35 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 811 (2004). A similar Ohio law, enacted in
2000, was recently sustained against constitutional attack. See State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady,
840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006).
20 See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1999); Witso v. Overby, 627
N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 2001); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994); State ex rel. Roy Allen
S. v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1996); see also Carbone, supra note 3, at 1317 ("Over
twenty states permit putative fathers to establish paternity even over the objections of the
mother and her husband.").
21 For example, in J.S.A. v. M.H., 797 N.E.2d 705 (111. App. Ct. 2003), vacated on other
grounds, 841 N.E.2d 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), an appellate court held that a man was entitled
to establish paternity through DNA tests of a child fathered during an extramarital affair with
a married woman, notwithstanding the opposition of the married couple and a trial court's
determination that DNA testing would not be in the child's best interests. In a separate case,
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a husband's facial constitutional attack against the statute
allowing his parental status to be set aside based on DNA testing sought by the wife's par-
amour. See In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. 2004).
22 See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 326-27 ("Increasing emphasis is being placed on estab-
lished and intended parenting relationships, with these factors sometimes weighing equally
with or even out-weighing biology.").
23 See, e.g., Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d
539 (N.J. 2000); Clifford K. v. Paul S., 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005); see also Melanie B.
Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for
Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (2002); Solangel Maldanado, When
Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel
v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865 (2003).
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in the absence of a marriage license, adoption decree, or any pretense of a genetic
connection - based primarily upon the intentions of the party to assume that status.
This is possible, for instance, in cases in which a couple uses assisted reproduction
to produce a child genetically unrelated to one or both of the partners,24 or in which
a man executes a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity with full knowledge that
he is not the child's biological father. In 2005, the supreme courts of California and
Washington each held that when a lesbian couple undertakes together to conceive and
raise a child, both partners should be considered legal parents of the resulting child.26
Thus, the law of parentage seems to be lurching erratically in different directions
at the same time. In one context, an understanding of parenthood rooted essentially
in biology looms larger than ever, allowing a biological father to displace a marital
father on the basis of a DNA test. In another, new and dominant weight is given to
social parenting and the assumption of a caregiving role. Taken together, these devel-
opments have broadened the bases on which parentage can be claimed and created
substantial new potential for conflicts among assertions of parentage grounded var-
iously in marriage, biology, adoption, and caregiving.
The burgeoning indeterminacy in the law of parentage has opened new space for
considerations of a child's interests in the matter. Where there are multiple plausible
claims to parentage of a child, there must be some basis for favoring one over the
other. At one time, the law reflected a clear sense of priority: the social interest in
preserving the intact marital family against disruption might trump an outsider's
24 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); In re
C.K.G., No. M2003-01320-COA-R3-JV, 2004 WL 1402560 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 22, 2004),
affd in part, vacated in part, 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005); see also Unif. Parentage Act §
703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 356 (Supp. 2005); Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the
Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL FORuM 393, 410-21; Richard F.
Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the FunctionalApproach
to Parentage, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 597 (2002).
25 See, e.g., In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002); Michael Higgins, Meaning of 'Dad'
Widened by Judge: Man RuledFatherof UnrelatedBoy, Cn. TRIB., Sept. 17,2004, at Al. But
see Seger v. Seger, 780 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a man's voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity - in the face of knowledge that he was not the child's bio-
logical father - was "fraudulent" and therefore legally ineffective). See generally Jayna
Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments ofPaternity: Should Biology Play a Role
in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REv. 479 (2005) (discussing the
voluntary paternity acknowledgment process and the problems resulting from allowing later
actions to disestablish paternity).
26 See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); In re Parentage of L.B., 122
P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005). An intermediate appellate court in Indiana reached the same con-
clusion a year earlier. See In re A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ("We...
hold that when two women involved in a domestic relationship agree to bear and raise a child
together by artificial insemination of one of the partners with donor semen, both women are
the legal parents of the resulting child."), vacated, 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005). See generally
Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian
Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 433 (2005).
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claim of biological parentage, as in Michael H. ;27 where marital stability was already
lost, biological connection often trumped social role in determining parentage, as
when a husband sought promptly to rebut the marital presumption of paternity with
proof of his complete "non-access" to his wife.28 "[S]ocial parenting" - without
adoption, marriage to the mother, or any pretense of genetic parentage - clearly
came last and ordinarily provided no basis at all for legal parentage.29
Today, however, there is no settled categorical ranking of the various bases for
parentage. In the resulting muddle, some judges have concluded that the priorities
should be sorted out from case to case by determining the best interests of the affected
children. In In re Jesusa V.,30 the California Supreme Court held that when multiple
adults potentially qualify as a child's parents, the court should determine which among
them would be the most appropriate parent by "'weigh[ing] considerations of policy
and logic.' 3' In that case, two men each qualified as "presumed father[s]" of a two-
year-old girl under California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act.32 Heriberto
was the girl's biological father and had lived with the girl and her mother for much
of the child's life.33 Paul was married to the girl's mother, though they had lived
apart at the time of Jesusa's conception, and he testified that "Jesusa had lived with
him from time to time when her mother came to San Diego to visit her other children"
in Paul's custody.34 Accordingly, both men qualified as "presumed father[s]" because
each had "received the child into his home and openly held her out as his child. 35 In
27 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
29 For example, in CM. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1995), the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ruled that there was simply no legal basis for an unmarried man to establish
parentage of a child he had neither fathered biologically nor adopted. The court readily ac-
knowledged that the man had lived with the mother during her pregnancy and taken on the
functional role of a parent:
The plaintiff [man] attended child birth classes.., and was in the deliv-
ery room when the child was born. His name appears as the father on the
child's birth certificate. The parties chose the name of the child together
and the child has the plaintiff's last name. The plaintiff, the mother, and
the child lived together as a family for three years. The plaintiff devoted
much time to caring for the child. At times, he served as primary care-
taker while the mother worked.
Id. at 154-55. Nevertheless, the court found no basis for conferring legal parentage: "A non-
parent can establish parental rights by adopting the child. The plaintiff did not adopt the child."
Id. at 155 n.5 (citation omitted).
30 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205 (Cal. 2004).
3, See id. at 215-16 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b)).
32 Id. at 215.
31 Id. at 219.
34 Id. at 211.
" Id. at 215 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d)).
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addition, Paul qualified on the separate ground that he was married to Jesusa' s mother
at the time of the child's birth.36
Faced with conflicting presumptions of paternity, the court reasoned that it was
required to select the best candidate by identifying "'the presumption which on the
facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic."' 37 This entails
a highly discretionary balancing of "all relevant factors" bearing on a child's interests
under which no single consideration - whether biological connection or a history
of social parenting - would be entitled to presumptive priority.38 Under this test,
"the scales favored Paul" because he had offered a stable, nurturing home environ-
ment with extended family while Heriberto had brutally assaulted Jesusa' s mother.39
The California court's assumption of authority to assign parentage between com-
peting claimants based upon its determination of the child's best interests finds
support in several other jurisdictions.4 ° In a real sense, then, some courts have
already embraced the premise of "best-interests" parentage. And, given the growing
indeterminacy of parentage law, it is likely that more jurisdictions will follow in the
same direction. 4' It remains, however, to be determined whether an exclusively child-
centered approach to parentage is constitutional.
II. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PARENTAL IDENTITY?
At first glance, a "best interests" approach to parentage of the sort embraced in
California and contemplated by some of the reform proposals in this Symposium
might seem to face daunting constitutional challenges. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the
36 Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (a)).
3 Id. at 215-16 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b)).
38 Id. at 220.
'9 Id. at 219-20.
4 E.g., N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000); Doe v. Doe, 52 P.3d 255 (Haw. 2002);
Witso v. Overby, 627 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 2001); Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Wright v. Byer,
678 N.W.2d 586 (S.D. 2004); G.D.K. v. Dep't of Fam. Servs., 92 P.3d 834 (Wyo. 2004);
Baker, supra note 15, at 13 ("In cases in which two... [paternity] presumption[s] clash or
where one of the presumptions clashes with biological evidence, courts often resolve the
issue with reference to a best interest of the child analysis, not by virtue of a blood test.").
41 Professor Janet Dogin, for example, suggests that surrogacy and other assisted-
reproduction cases may spur greater judicial resort to "best interests" assessments in assign-
ing parentage. See DOLGIN, supra note 1, at 213-15. Miller, supra note 14, at 707-11 (advo-
cating the use of a best interests test to determine the parentage of children born through
assisted reproduction where the parties have failed to assign parentage through a judicially
approved contract). Ironically, however, the collapse of social consensus about the meaning
of parenthood may render the indeterminate "best interests" standard essentially unhelpful at
the same time that it makes resort to the standard more likely. As Professor Dolgin notes,
"Reliance on the best interests principle depends on at least the illusion (if not the reality) of
shared assumptions within society about the contours and meaning of family relationships."
Id. at 214.
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Supreme Court had suggested that utopian ideas about state reassignment of parentage
were fundamentally incompatible with American ideas about "the relation between
individual and State. 42 Much more recently, in Troxel v. Granville,43 the Supreme
Court expressed dismay at what it called a "breathtakingly broad" statute that per-
mitted "[a]ny person" to seek visitation with a child "at any time" based solely on
ajudge's determination that contact would be in the child's "best interest[s].'44 Appli-
cation of the statute to award regular visitation to grandparents was said to violate
a mother's fundamental rights as a parent because it "place[d] the best-interest deter-
mination solely in the hands of the judge," without requiring any deference to the
parent's own assessment of her children's interests.45 If the Court in Troxel was
distressed over the breadth and novelty of a law that permitted "best interests" visits
over a parent's objection, how much more shocking would it find a scheme that
allowed the reassignment of parenthood on the same basis?
In point of fact, Troxel was careful to stop short of holding that the use of a "best
interests" standard is altogether impermissible in non-parent visitation cases, conclud-
ing instead only that the trial court's application of that standard in the particular case
gave too little deference to the parent's own views on the matter.46 Nevertheless, if
42 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923). Indeed, just eleven years before Jesusa V., a majority on the
California Supreme Court had rejected the idea of assigning parentage based on a child's
"best interests" as raising "the repugnant specter of government interference in matters impli-
cating our most fundamental notions of privacy." Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n. 10
(Cal. 1993).
4' 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
44 Id. at 67 (emphases in original).
45 id.
46 See id. at 72-73. Accordingly, even after Troxel, a number of state courts have con-
cluded that use of the "best interests" standard is constitutional in non-parent visitation cases,
so long as judges give substantial deference to the concerns of parents in assessing the
interests of children. See, e.g., Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); In re
R.A., 891 A.2d 564 (N.H. 2005); Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165 (Ohio 2005); State ex
rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 2001). Some others, however, have ex-
tended the holding of Troxel to preclude non-parent visitation based solely on a "best
interests" determination. E.g., Denardo v. Bergamo, 863 A.2d 686 (Conn. 2005); Griffin v.
Griffin, 581 S.E.2d 899 (Va. Ct. App. 2003). Indeed, Professor John DeWitt Gregory has
noted that "subsequent state court decisions treating grandparent visitation have made law on
the subject even more disordered than it had been before the case was decided." John DeWitt
Gregory, Family Privacy and the Custody and Visitation Rights ofAdult Outsiders, 36 FAM.
L.Q. 163, 175 (2002). See also Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of
Troxel v. Granville and the Courts' Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes
Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT. REv. 14 (2003). The diversity of reactions, as Professor Dolgin
has observed, is rooted in Troxel's own uncertainty about how to reconcile traditional assum-
ptions with the fluid realities of modem family life:
That Troxel can be invoked to justify both judicial reliance on the
notion of de facto parentage.., and the courts' privileging of parents'
interests above competing interests.., reflects the deep ambivalence
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a parentage law were to operate throughout a child's upbringing, permitting a "best
interests" reassignment of parenthood at any time, there is no doubt that it would
face very strong constitutional objection. The loss of established parental status on
the basis of a bare best interests finding would plainly collide with constitutional
doctrine recognizing the fundamental rights of parents and demanding heightened
substantive and procedural protection in actions to terminate parental rights.
The participants in this Symposium, however, were asked to limit their focus to
the legal assignment of parentage at the time of a child's birth. Limiting the scope
of a child-centered parentage law to the initial assignment of parentage at or near the
child's birth suggests a ground upon which Troxel and other parents' rights cases
might be distinguished. For, while the Constitution clearly protects "parents' rights,"
it does not clearly or necessarily say who a parent is. Thus, in In re Parentage of
L.B.,4s the Washington Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not bar courts
from recognizing a new basis for parenthood in the common law for persons who
assume a parental role with the consent of a traditional legal parent. In that case, after
the break-up of their eleven-year relationship, a biological mother sought to cut off
her former partner from all contact with the child they had "jointly decided to
and widespread confusion that underlie the Supreme Court's "family"
jurisprudence - especially in cases involving children or the parent-
child relationship.
Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLuM. L.
REV. 337, 404 (2002). See also Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics:
The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523 (2000) [hereinafter
Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics]. She writes:
[R]ecent cases about paternity - both the unwed father cases and
cases... involving married men disclaiming the paternity of their wives'
children - illustrate the law's striving to preserve a traditional view of
family, while simultaneously constructing a series of new, but not alto-
gether consistent, rules that reflect various dimensions of actual con-
temporary families.
Id. at 534.
41 Cf. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that an indigent parent is entitled to
waiver of filing fees in appealing termination of parental rights); Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982) (holding that due process requires that the state prove grounds for termination by
clear and convincing evidence); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding
that appointment of counsel for indigent parents facing termination of parental rights may be
required on a case-by-case basis). Accordingly, state and lower federal courts have widely
considered it "settled that a state cannot terminate a parental relationship based solely on the
"best interests" of the child without some showing of parental unfitness." In re Heather B., 11
Cal. Rptr. 2d 891,904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); see also In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374-77 (Utah
1982) (striking down state that permitted terminate based upon a finding that "such ter-
mination will be in the child's best interests"); David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the
Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 782-87 (1999).
48 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
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conceive and raise."4 9 The court, emphasizing that the state's paramount public
policy is "to effectuate the best interests of the child in the face of differing notions
of family and to provide certain and needed economical and psychological support
and nurturing to ... children," recognized a new form of common-law parenthood
founded on the joint undertaking of a parental role.50 In response to the biological
mother's claim that conferring parentage on her former partner would violate her
constitutional rights as a parent, the court insisted that its extension of parenthood
to the former partner mooted the constitutional objection.5' The court reasoned:
Britain's primary argument is that the State, through judicial
action, cannot infringe on or materially interfere with her rights
as a biological parent in favor of Carvin' s rights as a nonparent
third party. However, today we hold that our common law recog-
nizes the status of defacto parents and places them in parity with
biological and adoptive parents in our state. Thus, if, on remand,
Carvin can establish standing as a de facto parent, Britain and
Carvin would both have a "fundamental liberty interest" in the
"care, custody, and control" of L.B.52
In effect, the court ruled that the constitutional barrier to "third party" custody
or visitation could be sidestepped simply by designating the third party a "parent."53
While the court agreed that a visitation order on behalf of the former partner would
have to survive strict judicial scrutiny if she were a non-parent, no such scrutiny was
required of the court's extension to her of parental status.54 Troxel's reaffirmation
of the fundamental rights of "parents" limits state power to redefine the substantive
prerogatives accorded parents, but does not "place any constitutional limitations on
the ability of states to legislatively, or through their common law, define a parent or
family."5
5
41 Id. at 163-64.
50 Id. at 176-77.
51 See id. at 178.
52 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). The
California Supreme Court relied on a similar rationale in Johnson v. Calvert. See 851 P.2d 776
(Cal. 1993). Johnson held that a wife who had donated an egg used in assisted reproduction -
rather than the surrogate who had carried the fetus and given birth - was the mother of the
resulting child based upon her intention to become a parent. See id. The court held that the
denial of parenthood to the surrogate implicated no "parental rights" under the Constitution
because those rights are dependent on recognition as a parent under state law. Id. at 786.
53 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 178.
14 Id. at 177-78.
5 Id. at 178. The court elaborated:
[C]ontrary to Britain's assertions, Troxel does not establish that recog-
nition of a de facto parentage right infringes on the liberty interests of
a biological or adoptive parent.... Troxel did not address the issue of
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Along similar lines, Professor Emily Buss has contended that
the Constitution should be read to afford strong protection to
parents' exercise of child-rearing authority but considerably weaker
protection to any individual's claim to parental identity. This
means that a state has broad authority to identify nontraditional
caregivers as parents, and, if it does so, it must afford their child-
rearing decisions the same strong protection afforded more tradi-
tional parental figures. 6
For Professor Buss, the Constitution should be interpreted to protect the rights of
parents, without specifying the parents who hold rights, because such an approach
best serves the interests of children.5 7 Parental rights under the Constitution are justi-
fied, in her view, by their utility in promoting child welfare.58 "[S]trong deference
to parents' child-rearing decisions serves children well,, 59 Professor Buss argues,
for at least two reasons. First, "[p]arents' strong emotional attachment to their
children and considerable knowledge of their particular needs" generally give them
superior judgment about the child's interests. 6° And, second, "even good state deci-
sions about child-rearing practices are likely to produce bad results when the state
relies on resistant parents to carry them oUt. ' ' 61 These rationales support strong
constitutional concern for the authority exercised by parents, but relatively little
interest in the identity of the persons who are assigned that role. 62 That assignment
state law determinations of "parents" and "families," [but] rather simply
disapproved of the grant of visitation in that case, narrowly holding that
[t]he problem.., is not that the [trial court] intervened but that, when
it did so, "it gave no special weight at all" to the parents' determination
regarding the grandparents' visitation.
Id. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69) (emphasis in original).
56 Emily Buss, Essay, "Parental" Rights, 88 VA. L. REv. 635, 636 (2002).
57 See id. ("What drives this constitutional interpretation is, at bottom, an assessment of
its value to children.").
58 Id. at 646.
'9 Id. at 647.
60 Id. See also Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63
U. CHI. L. REv. 937 (1996); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81
VA. L. REv. 2401 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children's Welfare,
11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071 (2003).
61 See Buss, supra note 56, at 649.
62 See id. at 653.
While we can generally expect private individuals to make better judg-
ments than the state about how to raise their own children because of
their greater knowledge of, commitment to, and responsibility for those
children, this reasoning does not tell us how to distinguish among
various private competitors who all aim for this level of knowledge ....
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would, of course, be of profound concern to the adults who desire that role, but would
be largely incidental to this child-centered conception of parental rights.
On these theories, reform proposals that operate in the initial assignment of parent-
age largely evade the constitutional radar. And there is, in fact, some Supreme Court
authority which seems to point in this direction, suggesting that states do indeed have
broad authority in defining the scope of parenthood. Prince v. Massachusetts,63 for
example, assumed that a custodial aunt could assert constitutional parenting rights
based on her status as the child's guardian. Because state law granted the guardian
parental authority, the Court readily extended to her the constitutional "rights of
parenthood."' For much the same reason, most courts have concluded without any
difficulty that adoptive parents are entitled to the same constitutional rights as bio-
logical parents: parental rights under the Constitution follow the state's choice to
designate new parents.65
The Court's recent decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow66
is perhaps even more striking in its assumption of a broad state authority to control
the scope of parental rights under the Constitution. The Court concluded that a father
lacked standing to assert rights as a parent to object to the recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance at his daughter's public school because a state court custody order gave
final authority over her upbringing to the girl's mother.67
Significantly, both Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment, assumed that Michael Newdow's standing
to assert constitutional rights as a parent rested entirely on state law: "Newdow's par-
ental status," Stevens wrote, "is defined by California's domestic relations law.
' 6
That law "vests in Newdow a cognizable right to influence his daughter's religious up-
bringing" through his own interactions with her, but not "to dictate to others what they
may and may not say to his child respecting religion."'69 The parental authority that
Newdow specifically wished to assert - "to challenge the [religious] influences to
63 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
64 Id. at 166.
65 See, e.g., In re Nelson, 825 A.2d 501, 502 (N.H. 2003) (noting that case law has "ex-
tended such protection [of parental rights under the state constitution] to both natural and
adoptive parents"); Owenby v. Young, 579 S.E.2d 264, 267 (N.C. 2003) (stating that the
Constitution's protection of parental rights "is irrelevant in a custody proceeding between
two natural parents, whether biological or adoptive").
66 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
67 See id. at 13-18. Although the custody orders nominally granted both parents "joint
legal custody," the Supreme Court read them to assign final decisionmaking authority over
the girl's education to her mother in the event the parents disagreed. Id. at 2310 n.6 ("Under
either [custody] order, Newdow has the right to consult on issues relating to the child's edu-
cation, but Banning [the mother] possesses what we understand amounts to a tiebreaking
vote.").
61 Id. at 16.
69 Id.at 16-17.
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which his daughter may be exposed in school" - had been assigned by the state
court's custody order to the girl's mother instead. 70 Given the mother's endorsement
of the state's mandate of the Pledge, Newdow had no standing to complain.7' Although
Rehnquist, based on a different construction of California custody law, would have
permitted Newdow to present his constitutional claim, he agreed with the majority
that "[t]he correct characterization of respondent's [constitutional] interest [as a parent]
rests on the interpretation of state law. 72
In this way, Newdow might be seen as treating "parenthood" like "property" under
the Constitution 73 - the good itself is protected, but its definition is generally left to
the states.74 If this is right, then states might well have broad discretion to redefine who
counts as a parent, including the power to base that decision on their assessment of
the interests of children.
Yet, on the question of state power to define parentage, this line of cases ending in
Newdow is only half the story.7" There are other cases - most obviously the Supreme
Court's "unwed father" cases - suggesting the existence of meaningful constitu-
tional limits to a state's power to withhold parenthood. In Stanley v. Illinois,7 6 the Court
effectively overruled a policy choice by the State of Illinois to deny parental status to
unwed biological fathers. The Supreme Court held, however, that Peter Stanley, like
"all Illinois parents," was "constitutionally entitled to a hearing on [his] fitness before
70 Id. at 17.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 23 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
13 This argument is presented at greater length in David D. Meyer, Partners, Caregivers,
and the Constitutional Substance of Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
7" As the Court has often explained, "Property interests are not created by the Constitution,
'they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law .... .' Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)). See also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.5 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2005) (explaining the pro-
cedural due process protection accorded property).
" And maybe not even that: after all, there is good reason to think that other reasons -
including, most obviously, a desire to avoid decision on the merits of an awkward and politi-
cally explosive issue - may have driven the result in Newdow. See Newdow, 124 U.S. at 25
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the Court's standing concerns as
"ad hoc improvisations" for avoiding the merits of Newdow's claim); Douglas Laycock,
Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the
Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARv. L. REv. 155, 224 (2004) (observing that "[i]n
Newdow, it may have been politically impossible to affirm and legally impossible to reverse"
on the merits of the First Amendment claim).
76 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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[his] children [could be] removed from [his] custody., 77 Implicit in this holding, of
course, was ajudgment that unwed fathers such as Peter Stanley are constitutionally
entitled to state recognition as parents.
Subsequent cases have made clear that this entitlement rests on something more
than just a genetic connection, and that unwed fathers who hesitate to get involved can
forfeit any claim to parenthood.78 But "[t]he significance of the biological connection,"
the Court explained in Lehr v. Robertson,79
is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps
that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child rela-
tionship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development.8'
Lehr is ambiguous, but it can be read to support a constitutional claim based on
"parenting aspirations." The important question that Lehr left unanswered is whether
the Constitution values only established parenting relationships or whether it pro-
tects the very opportunity to develop a parenting relationship for those who did what
they could.81 Lehr itself was not required to resolve the question because the major-
ity concluded that Jonathan Lehr, in all events, had not done all he could have to
demonstrate his paternal interest.8 2 There is plausible support for each understand-
ing of the case. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that
the Constitution's protection of family relationships arises from the lived "intimacy
of daily association," implying that protection would not be triggered in the absence
of established emotional bonds.83 On the other, Lehr and other cases seem to take
77 Id. at 658.
78 See Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing
Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271 (2005); Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and
the Constitution: Biology 'Plus'Defines Relationships; BiologyAlone Safeguards the Public
Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47 (2004); Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children"
and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.:
Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 1 (1999).
'9 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
80 Id. at 262.
81 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Meyer, supra note 47, at 762--66.
82 See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. But see id. at 270-71 (White, J., dissenting) (portraying
Lehr's conduct more charitably).
83 See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)
("[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society,
stems [largely] from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily associ-
ation, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of
children." (second alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33
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account of the moral desert of putative fathers in drawing the boundaries of consti-
tutional protection, implying that a man who was wrongly blocked by others in his
efforts to establish a relationship with his child might deserve constitutional protection.
This is precisely the view that some state courts have taken in holding that "thwarted
fathers" are constitutionally entitled to block the adoptions of their children.~'
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,85 the Supreme Court's next case involving the rights
of unwed fathers, might be thought to have disproved the notion that parenting
"aspirations" are protected, given that it upheld the state's decision to ignore the aspi-
rations of a genetic father who had in fact developed a caregiving relationship with
his daughter.8 6 In that case, an unmarried man who had fathered a child during an
affair with a married woman was precluded from establishing his paternity by a
California law that barred third-party challenges to the marital presumption of
paternity. 7 Even though the claimant had lived for a time with the girl and her
mother, before the mother reunited with her husband, the Court held that he was not
constitutionally entitled to foist himself upon "the unitary family. 88 Yet, Michael
H. is not conclusive here because it refused to credit parenting aspirations in a very
particular context - where crediting those aspirations would have intruded directly
on the role and status of an established parent (the husband). In that sense, Michael
H. is much like Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,89
in which the Court subordinated the parenting aspirations of foster parents to the
(1972))); see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (noting that when an unwed father demonstrates a
commitment to parenting, his interest in contact with his child acquires constitutional pro-
tection); Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Cal. 1998) ("A biological father's
mere desire to establish a personal relationship with the child is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the due process clause."); Lisa I. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d
927,935 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("A protected liberty interest does not arise from biological con-
nection alone but from the existing relationship, if any, between the biological father and
child.").
'4 Best known on this point are the Baby Richard and Baby Jessica cases. See In re
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 333 (111. 1995); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992);
In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649,664 (Mich. 1993). Many other courts, however, have agreed
that the Constitution protects an "opportunity interest" for parents to develop a relationship
with their children, even if the opportunity may be fleeting. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Connor
W., No. B 164756, 2003 WL 22941219 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2003); In re Appeal of H.R.,
581 A.2d 1141, 1162-63 (D.C. 1990); Bowers v. Pearson, 609 S.E.2d 174, 176-78 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005); In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 487 n.1 (Iowa 1995); Smith v.
Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490,497 (Miss. 1998); Brown v. Malloy, 546 S.E.2d 195,200-01 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2001); In re C.L., 878 A.2d 207, 210-11 (Vt. 2005); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d
720, 747-50 (W. Va. 1998).
85 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
86 Id. at 118-30.
87 See id. at 117-18.
18 See id. at 123-24.
89 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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established ties of the "natural" family.9° Accordingly, neither Michael H. nor Smith
excludes the possibility that the Constitution might protect well-grounded parenting
aspirations in circumstances where realization of the aspirations would not displace
another, existing parenting bond.9
What criteria then would define what qualifies as a "well-grounded" parenting
aspiration? The Supreme Court has given hints, of course: biology (as in Stanley92
and Lehr93); caregiving (as in Caban v. Mohammed 94 and Lehr95); marriage and the
assumption of stable commitments (in Michael H. 96); and, in all cases, diligence in
demonstrating parental interest - all are relevant, yet none alone is sufficient.97
Some combination of these factors, however, will almost certainly be enough to trigger
constitutional protection. Imagine, for example, a genetic father who, with the full
support of the mother, has done everything possible to assume a caregiving role -
attending childbirth and parenting classes with the expectant mother, contributing
financially toward her prenatal expenses, forgoing career opportunities in anticipation
of substantial childcare responsibilities after the child's birth, and generally joining
with the expectant mother in planning for the child's future. And suppose further that
90 See id. at 846; cf. DOWD, supra note 11, at 112 (noting that "outside marriage, father-
hood has been protected only as long as it does not threaten the marriage of another man.").
9' This appears to be the conclusion of the California courts. The California Supreme
Court has held that substantive due process protects the "opportunity interest" of an un-
married biological father to establish and develop a parent-child relationship where adoption
of the child is sought by others. See In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1228-29,
1236-37 (Cal. 1992); cf. In re Zacharia D., 862 P.2d 751, 761-62 (Cal. 1993) (suggesting
same entitlement in context of a child dependency proceeding). But it has also held that no
such "opportunity interest" exists where the child is residing with the mother and her hus-
band and where its realization would disrupt the child's established ties to the marital father.
See Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Cal. 1998) ("[A] biological father's
mere desire to establish a personal relationship with the child is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the due process clause."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1055 (1998); see also
Lisa I. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 927,938 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The Georgia Supreme
Court has come to the same conclusion. Compare In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459
(Ga. 1987) (holding that an unwed father is constitutionally entitled to block adoption unless
he has acted to abandon his "opportunity interest" in developing a parent-child relationship),
with Dano v. LaBrec, 549 S.E.2d 76, 77 (Ga. 2001) (holding that an unwed father has no
constitutional right to establish a parent-child relationship where doing so would entail
"delegitimitiz[ing] a legitimate child and... break[ing] up a legally recognized family unit
already in existence").
92 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
9' Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258-61 (1983).
94 441 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1979).
9' Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-68.
96 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
17 See Baker, supra note 15, at 34 (contending "that the most important factor in deter-
mining whether a genetic father will be entitled to constitutional protection of his parental
rights is his relationship with the mother," and noting that unmarried fathers generally prevail
where there is evidence of an agreement with the child's mother to share parental status).
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recognizing this man's expected parenthood would not displace any other parental
relationship. At least on these facts, the man's expectations of parenthood would
seem to be very strong indeed and would find wide social acceptance. If the state
were to intervene at the time of the child's birth and deny him parental status, the
Constitution would surely demand something more from the state than merely rational
conjecture as the basis for its action. It would recognize that such an individual is
presumptively entitled to fulfill his aspirations to become a parent absent a demon-
stration of a substantial public interest to the contrary.
Some will object that thinking about parenthood in this way - as triggered by
some formula of factors - is not child-focused, and that its operation would sometimes
lead to the destruction of caregiving relationships that fall outside the formula.9 8
This criticism strikes me as quite accurate, and yet I am not convinced that the
Constitution itself is truly so child-centered in its protection of parental rights. Rather,
'it seems to me that family-privacy rights, like other non-textual constitutional rights,
are ultimately grounded in strong social consensus that the right at issue deserves
protection." The social consensus that undergirds parental rights is based partly on
the assumption that they work to the benefit of children, but partly also on a sense
of justice and desert for adults."° Our social understandings of parenthood are now
fluid and complex, which is why it is so difficult to identify with precision when
constitutional protection is triggered in the unwed father cases.' °' But to the extent
parentage reform proposals would place significant barriers in the path of persons
regarded as "parents" by widely shared social consensus, it will trigger serious con-
stitutional review.
98 As Professor Buss cogently observes:
The problem with the Lehr formula is the problem with any formula that confers
parental identity on an individual without regard to his parental competitors. While
requiring some relationship in addition to biological paternity will in many cases
identify an individual who stands in an unambiguous parental relationship with a
child, it will also capture those who relationships are less central, in relative terms,
to children. Where one relational claim may compete with others, automatically con-
ferring identity rights on one subset of relational claimants is as destructive for
children as automatically conferring identity rights on the basis of biology alone.
Buss, supra note 56, at 660.
99 For a more complete articulation of this point, see David D. Meyer, Justice White and
the Right of Privacy: A Model of Realism and Restraint, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 915 (2003).
'00 Elizabeth Bartholet, James Dwyer, and Barbara Woodhouse have each powerfully
demonstrated this point in scholarship critically examining the history and contemporary appli-
cation of parents-rights doctrine. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN:
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999); JAMES G.
DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
1747 (1993).
'o' See Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics, supra note 46, at 534; Meyer,
supra note 3.
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III. SCRUTINIZING THE BEST INTERESTS TEST IN THE CONTEXT OF
PARENTAGE DETERMINATIONS
Of course, saying that substantive barriers to parenthood will trigger serious re-
view does not necessarily mean they are unconstitutional. It means only that the
barrier must be scrutinized to determine whether its public justifications outweigh
its private costs for the individual rights-holder. In this part, I suggest some of the
considerations that courts are likely to weigh in determining the constitutionality of
denying parentage to persons with qualifying parental aspirations in order to further
the best interests of children.
To begin, the appropriate test in this context is not strict scrutiny. To be sure,
Justices Scalia and Thomas, as well as many state courts, have expressed the view that
strict scrutiny applies to any significant incursions on fundamental rights of family
privacy.'0 2 And that is certainly in keeping with the usual practice in the broader con-
text of fundamental rights under substantive due process. In the particular context of
family-privacy rights, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly sidestepped strict
scrutiny in favor of softer, or at least more ambiguous, standards of review. In cases
going back to Moore v. City of East Cleveland'0 3 and Zablocki v. Redhail,' 4 the Court
has seemed to hedge in its description of the applicable standard, omitting the usual
catch phrases of strict scrutiny ("compelling" interests and "narrow tailoring"). 0 5
More recently, and more tellingly, Troxel v. Granville pointedly failed to employ
strict scrutiny after having found a significant burden on the fundamental rights of
a parent. Justice Thomas wrote separately in Troxel to point out the "curious[]"
omission of strict scrutiny, but the omission was plainly not an oversight."6 As the
Oregon Supreme Court recently observed:
[T]wo conclusions safely can be drawn from Troxel. First, with
the exception of Justice Scalia, all the members of the Court agreed
that the Due Process Clause protects, to some degree, a fit parent's
right to make decisions for a child. Second, of the eight justices
who recognized a constitutional protection for parental rights,
only Justice Thomas concluded that the constitution requires
102 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); In re L.F., 121
P.3d 267, 270 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564, 576 (N.H. 2005); MBB v.
ERW, 100 P.3d 415,419 (Wyo. 2004).
'03 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
104 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
15 See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REv. 527,540-44
(2000).
1o6 See 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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strict scrutiny of state actions that intrude upon those rights.
The other opinions articulated an undefined but less exacting
standard.' 0'
The Court followed the same path three years later in Lawrence v. Texas.'08 There,
in striking down a Texas law criminalizing sexual intimacy between two persons of
the same sex, the Court again failed to apply any clearly recognizable standard of
constitutional scrutiny. Justice Scalia, dissenting in the case, pounced on language
in the majority opinion stating that the Texas law "furthers no legitimate state
interest""' 9 in order to characterize the decision as embracing rational-basis review
and finding no fundamental right." 0 A careful reading of the Court's opinion, how-
ever, arguably suggests that Lawrence did indeed find that the statute intruded upon
a fundamental privacy right. "' The Court went to considerable pains to explain why
protection of the petitioners' relational interests in Lawrence followed directly and
logically from the line of fundamental privacy cases stretching back to Griswold v.
Connecticut."2 Its failure, then, to employ strict scrutiny and its use instead of a
more indeterminate standard is surely notable." 
3
"07 In re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721,730 (Or. 2004) (footnote omitted),
cert. denied sub nom. Lamont v. O'Donnell, 543 U.S. 1050 (2005). See also Emily Buss,
Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SuP. CT. REv. 279
(arguing that the Court is unsuccessfully attempting to chart a middle course between the pre-
servation of parental rights and the recognition of nonparental claims); Stephen G. Gilles,
Parental (and Grandparental) Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 9 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 69
(2001) (criticizing Troxel's "tacit intermediate-scrutiny review" for giving inadequate pro-
tection to parental prerogative); David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After
Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1140-50 (2001) (suggesting that the Troxel
decision represents a lack of confidence by the Court about constitutional intervention into
the family).
108 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
'09 Id. at 578.
"o Id. at 586, 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"' See David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453; Laurence H.
Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV.
L. REv. 1893 (2004). For a review of the many different ways in which Lawrence has been
understood, see Mark Strasser, Monogamy, Licentiousness, Desuetude and Mere Tolerance: The
Moral Misinterpretations of Lawrence v. Texas, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & WoMEN's STUD. 95
(2005).
112 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (stating that "the most pertinent beginning point is our
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).").
"' See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA J.
CONST. L. 954, 958-70 (2004) (noting that Lawrence's seeming use of a standard of scrutiny
in between ordinary rational basis review and strict scrutiny raises fundamental questions
about "the utility. .. of identifying any given liberty as fundamental, quasi-fundamental,
nonfundamental but still special, or just plain nonfundamental"); Michael A. Scaperlanda,
Illusions of Liberty and Equality: An "Alien's" View of Tiered Scrutiny, Ad Hoc Balancing,
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The Justices' failure to apply strict scrutiny in Troxel, Lawrence, and other cases
almost certainly stems from their appreciation of the special complexities that often
attend adjudication of family privacy claims. Unlike many other assertions of fun-
damental rights, family-privacy controversies often involve conflicting claims of
individual rights. As various Justices have observed, vindication of one parent's "fun-
damental right" to the "care, custody, and control" of her child, for example, may well
impede directly on the privacy rights of the other parent, or potentially the child, a
sibling of the child, or another family member." 4 The need to mediate among con-
flicting individual interests within the family counsels avoidance of a standard like
strict scrutiny which heavily privileges the rights of a single claimant. As Justice
O'Connor explained, in the year following her plurality opinion in Troxel:
[T]he adjudication of constitutional disputes does not necessarily
translate to the effective resolution of family disputes. While con-
stitutional due process doctrine is primarily concerned with the
relationship of individuals to the State, the resolution of family
disputes focuses primarily on the relationship of individuals with
Governmental Power, and Judicial Imperialism, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 5,6 (2005) (observing
that "Grutter and Lawrence are but the latest in a series of cases trending away from several
decades of categorical balancing and toward a new regime of ad hoc or sliding scale
balancing," and criticizing this trend as giving inadequate protection to individual rights);
Tribe, supra note 111, at 1916-17 (discussing Lawrence's .'[m]ysterious' standard ofreview").
14 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens, for example, noted:
Cases like this do not present a bipolar struggle between the parents
and the State over who has final authority to determine what is in a
child's best interests. There is at a minimum a third individual, whose
interests are implicated in every case to which the statute applies - the
child.
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature
of a child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-
like bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents
and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such
intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so,
too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.
Id. at 86-88 (citation omitted). See also id. at 97-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that
assertion of a parent's rights may intrude upon the child's established relationships with a
non-parent caregiver); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 (2004) (ob-
serving that "[t]he difficulty ... is that Newdow's rights, as in many cases touching upon
family relations, cannot be viewed in isolation," and that vindication of Newdow's claim
might conflict with the rights of the child and her mother). Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional
Privacy and the Just Family, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 955,986-87 (1993) ("Unlike the right of indi-
vidual privacy - which entitles the individual to rights against the state and over herself-
parental rights entitle parents to rights against thestate, but over another person.").
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each other. In family cases, the rights of individuals are inter-
twined, and the family itself has a collective personality. Thus,
the due process model may not be the best framework for resolv-
ing multi-party conflicts where children, parents, professionals,
and the State all have conflicting interests." 5
Accordingly, instead of insisting on proof of "compelling interests" and "narrow
tailoring," the Court has weighed in a more nuanced and flexible manner the compet-
ing public and private interests, varying the aggressiveness of its review depending
on several recurring considerations, including the extent of the burden the challenged
action would impose on family privacy, the degree to which family members are
unified in resisting the state's imposition, and the novelty or historical pedigree of the
private interest and the state action."
6
In evaluating a law that made parentage contingent on an assessment of the best
interests of children, the fact that the reforms we are discussing would operate at or
near birth is plainly relevant. A core reason why the Constitution requires deference
to parents' own judgments about their children's best interests is that parents are pre-
sumed to have superior knowledge of their children and motivation to act on their
behalf."7 But the basis of parents' presumed insight is not biology (because, after
all, adoptive parents are entitled to deference too"18), but experience and attachment.
By intervening so early, before a parent has much chance to acquire child-specific
experience and attachment, there may be a somewhat broader allowance for the
substituted judgment of courts.
There are, however, other concerns about the best interests test, including the poten-
tial for bias and arbitrariness that flows from its essential indeterminacy. The best
interests standard has faced long and widespread criticism from scholars and judges
alike for this reason.' 9 These concerns might well push courts to demand some
"' The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, The Supreme Court and the Family, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 573, 575-76 (2001).
116 See Meyer, supra note 105, at 579-94.
"l7 See Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 733,
778-79 (2001); Buss, supra note 56, at 647-48; Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children:
A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 953-55 (1996); Scott, supra note 60, at
1078-79.
11 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
"9 See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes
in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477,481 (1984); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference,
and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 11, 53-64 (1994);
Steven N. Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard
as an Imperfect but Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
449 (2005); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA 's
Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2220-23 (1991); Cynthia Starnes, Swords
in the Hands of Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After Troxel, 2003 WIs. L. REV. 115,
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restraint in applying the standard - just as Troxel effectively required judges to
incorporate a presumption in favor of parental judgment into any application of the
best-interests test in non-parent visitation cases - but would not necessarily bar its
use altogether in the parentage context.
20
Finally, constitutional scrutiny would certainly take account of the stakes of the
best-interests decision for the putative parent. That application of a best-interest
parentage law threatens a total loss of the parent-child relationship - as opposed
to a lesser burden, such as having to suffer unwanted contact with a grandparent or
even a loss of custody - would clearly ratchet up the demands of the public justifi-
cation. Courts routinely and properly take into consideration the quality and degree
of state intrusion on protected privacy interests in calibrating the strength of judicial
review, demanding a stronger showing of public need to justify terminating parental
rights, for instance, than for a mere visitation order. 121 To be sure, a parentage law
that denied a claimant a legitimate expectation of parenthood would entail a lesser
burden than a law which terminated the parental rights of a long-established care-
giver. Nevertheless, the total loss of even an expectancy of a parent-child relation-
ship remains a very substantial imposition on the individual, increasing the appropriate
degree of scrutiny.
This mix of considerations suggests thatjudicial tolerance of a best-interests stan-
dard in assigning parentage would vary with the circumstances of individual cases.
Given the high stakes for the individuals involved, however, and general doubts
about judicial competence in administering the best interests test, courts are likely
to demand something more than simply the state's discernment of a marginal advan-
tage to a child from shifting parentage away from a figure widely regarded as a
parent by social consensus. Conceivably, the required showing might be satisfied
by a convincing demonstration of a very substantial benefit to the child (a sort of
heightened best-interests showing) or a serious risk of harm to the child from recog-
nition of parentage in the claimant figure.
In the final chapter of his new book, in presenting his full proposal for parentage
law reform, Professor Dwyer points to empirical evidence about the prospects for
harm to children from being raised by parents with certain backgrounds or personal
119-20, 164 n.247 (2003). As Professor Starnes notes, "The difficulty of applying this vague
standard to the complex task of choosing a child's custodian inspired courts to rely on numer-
ous heuristics, among them the 'tender years' doctrine, an assumption that nature intends
young children to be with their mother," and deference to an older child's stated preference.
Starnes, supra, at 119-20 (footnote omitted).
120 See Dowd, supra note 78, at 1331 (acknowledging but overcoming potential objections
to the best interests standard).
121 See, e.g., Crowley v. McKinney, 400 F.3d 965, 968-69 (7th Cir. 2005) (considering
the relative degree of intrusion on parental control of education in reducing constitutional
scrutiny of public school's decision to bar a non-custodial parent from campus); see also
Meyer, supra note 105, at 587-89.
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attributes.'22 He observes that characteristics such as "drug or alcohol abuse, being
of a very young age, criminality, past abusiveness toward children or adults, and mental
illness" correlate with higher rates of parental failure.'23 Courts would surely demand
exceedingly persuasive proof of these claims. It strikes me that certain very narrow
restrictions on parenthood might be sustained on evidence specific to the putative
parent (such as a history of committing severe abuse on other children, for instance),
but that more expansive restrictions (based solely on the claimant's age or poverty,
for instance) would stand on far more doubtful ground. 124
CONCLUSION
The invitation of this Symposium to rethink the laws assigning parentage is a
welcome one. Comprehensive reexamination of our parentage laws is very much
needed. At present, parentage law is growing more incoherent because of ill-considered
responses by courts and legislatures to new methods of scientific proof of paternity,
breakthroughs in reproductive technology, and changes in family living patterns.
Moreover, the aspiration of this Symposium to reform parentage law in a direction
that takes greater account of the needs and interests of children is also well-timed.
122 DWYER, supra note 100, at 256-57.
123 Id. at 256.
124 In this article, I have evaluated the "best interests" screen as if it applied to all potential
parents. But, of course, virtually all of the reform proposals generated by this Symposium
draw a number of classifications - including those based on gender, marital status, age, dis-
ability, poverty, and other traits. In keeping with the space constraints of the Symposium, I
will simply acknowledge without attempting to address seriously the equal protection issues
raised by these various classifications. Setting aside the gender distinctions - and acknowl-
edging that the Supreme Court has been willing to tolerate some fairly significant gender
distinctions in the parentage context based on fundamental sex differences relating to pro-
creation and childbirth, see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62-66 (2001) - the proposed
classifications are otherwise non-suspect under equal protection doctrine, notwithstanding
any disproportionate impact they might have along racial, ethnic, or other lines. Yet, if it is
true that substantive due process would recognize a fundamental right of at least some
persons to assert parental identity, then classifications bearing on that right would also be
subject to close scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d
466, 481-82 (Ill. 2005) (closely scrutinizing classifications in a statute stating grounds for
terminating parental rights). Without carefully scrutinizing each of these, I would only men-
tion here that classifications based on poverty or disability are likely to face especially rough
sledding. In the context of other fundamental rights, such as voting and access to the courts,
the Supreme Court has been hostile toward classifications that penalize the poor, see, e.g.,
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 356-57 (1963), and I would expect the same result here. Cf. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 125 (1996) (recognizing special constitutional protection for an indigent parent "en-
deavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds").
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Throughout family law - and even in the constitutional law of family privacy -
courts and lawmakers are beginning to recognize and credit in a more substantial
way the independent interests of children within the family.'25
While I therefore welcome the ambition of this Symposium and many of the
specific proposals it has inspired, I also believe that the Constitution places meaning-
ful outer limits on state discretion to reinvent the concept of parenthood. Those limits
are grounded in core social consensus about who counts as a parent. Given shifting
attitudes and contemporary uncertainty on this point, the scope of our consensus is
surely narrower today than it was fifty or even twenty-five years ago. Accordingly,
the constitutional limits, though real, are broad - and almost certainly broad enough
to accomplish significant and much needed child-focused reform of traditional
parentage laws.
125 See David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children's Relationship Rights, 11 WM.
& MARY Bi.L RTS. J. 1117, 1119-20 (2003).
